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Holland v. Boeing Co.: Extending Protection
Against Employment Discrimination To Transfers
Of Handicapped Employees
In Holland v. Boeing Co.,' the Washington Supreme Court
considered for the first time a handicap discrimination case under
the unfair employment practices section of the Washington Law
Against Discrimination.' In construing the statute, the Holland
court emphasized that the handicapped are inherently different
from other classes antidiscrimination legislation traditionally
protects. The court then imposed upon the defendant-employer
a high duty of accommodating the disabilities of handicapped
employees. Thus, the decision provides important recognition of
disabled workers' civil rights.
In Holland, a physically handicapped technician sought re-
1. 90 Wash. 2d 384, 583 P.2d 621 (1978).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (1976). The statute does not include a definition of
the term "handicapped." The state supreme court, however, has ruled the law is not
constitutionally vague and accepted the term as meaning a condition which prevents the
full and normal use of one's faculties. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington
Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976).
A recent Washington Court of Appeals decision has further refined the definition.
Noting that whether a person is "handicapped" is a question of law, the court cited a
Human Rights Commission regulation, WASH. AD. CODE § 162-22-040(1)(a) (1977), provid-
ing that "for enforcement purposes a person will be considered to be handicapped by a
sensory, mental, or physical condition if he or she is discriminated against because of the
condition and the condition is abnormal." Kimmel v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 23 Wash.
App. 78, 82, 596 P.2d 1069, 1071 (1979). The court then ruled that the plaintiff, who had
suffered previous injuries to his knees, had been unlawfully refused employment because
of the condition. Id. at 87, 596 P.2d at 1074.
The Crowley court has thus given a broad interpretation to the term "handicapped."
Theoretically, this decision should extend protection to persons with conditions one might
not otherwise consider a "handicap." While Washington courts have not yet reached the
issue, such conditions might include obesity and alcoholism. See Gittler, Fair Employ-
ment and the Handicapped: A Legal Perspective, 27 DE PAuL L. REv. 953, 985 (1978).
Such broadened protection would be just. Protection of the law should not hinge on
the source of the physical or mental condition when the same elements of discrimination
exist in all kinds of handicaps, whether temporary or permanent, voluntary or involun-
tary. Id. at 982-86. The evil that antidiscrimination law seeks to eliminate is employment
decisions based on employers' stereotyped assumptions and personal prejudices rather
than on individual merit and ability of the employee. Therefore, the law should not make
formalistic distinctions among subclasses of the handicapped. Id.
3. 90 Wash. 2d at 386, 583 P.2d at 622. At trial, the quality of Holland's performance
was a fact at issue. The defendant contended plaintiff was removed from his job at least
partly because his work was not satisfactory. Brief for Appellant at 4, Holland v. Boeing
Co., 90 Wash. 2d 384, 583 P.2d 621 (1978). The trial court, however, specifically found
that Holland's performance was adequate and that Boeing had never undertaken proce-
dures indicating otherwise before his transfer. Findings of Fact at 7.
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lief against Boeing for employment discrimination. The plaintiff,
suffering from cerebral palsy, had worked at Boeing for more than
twenty years, successfully 3 achieving a Grade 9 position.' In 1974,
because of a reduced workload, Boeing reassigned the plaintiff to
a job entailing tasks he could not perform satisfactorily. 5 Eventu-
ally, a supervisor recommended the plaintiff accept a lower grade
position-a move the plaintiff resisted. Boeing then attempted to
locate a different position of equal grade, but these efforts were
unsuccessful because of negative reports about the plaintiff's per-
formance in his new job.' Finally, the plaintiff's supervisor gave
him the choice of accepting a lower grade position or being fired.
The plaintiff reluctantly accepted a Grade 5 position, and then
brought suit for employment discrimination.
Holland asserted that Boeing committed an unfair employ-
ment practice, in violation of section 49.60.180 of the Washington
Revised Code,7 by reassigning him to a job Boeing knew, or rea-
4. The plaintiff was an experimental electronics technician, a job that required con-
siderable electronics knowledge and some manual skill. His duties consisted of trouble-
shooting and setting up electronics systems. Brief for Respondent at 2, Holland v. Boeing
Co., 90 Wash. 2d 384, 583 P.2d 621 (1978).
5. 90 Wash. 2d at 386, 583 P.2d at 622. The new job required greater manual dexter-
ity, including certified soldering. The court charged the defendant with knowledge of the
plaintiff's limitations because plaintiff had previously failed to receive certification in
soldering. Id. at 391, 583 P.2d at 624.
6. Id. at 386, 583 P.2d at 622. Supervisors had placed letters in the plaintiff's per-
sonnel file reporting his lack of ability. In addition, the results of a dexterity test, which
plaintiff had to take without the special tools he customarily used, further emphasized
his handicap.
7. The law states:
It is an unfair practice for any employer:
(1) To refuse to hire any person because of such person's age, sex, marital
status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental,
or physical handicap, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification:
Provided, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such handicap
shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of
the particular worker involved.
(2) To discharge or bar any person from employment because of such
person's age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the pres-
ence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap.
(3) To discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms
or conditions of employment because of such person's age, sex, marital status,
race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or
physical handicap: Provided, That it shall not be an unfair practice for any
employer to segregate washrooms or locker facilities on the basis of sex, or to
base other terms and conditions of employment on the sex of employees where
the board by regulation or ruling in a particular instance has found the employ-
ment practice to be appropriate for the practical realization of equality of oppor-
tunity between the sexes.
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (1976).
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sonably should have known, he could not perform. He also con-
tended Boeing had a number of nondiscriminatory alternatives to
the alleged discriminatory transfer. The employer could have ei-
ther transferred an able-bodied technician instead of Holland or
tranferred Holland to another equally suitable job classification.
Alternatively, Boeing could have declared a surplus in the plain-
tiffs job category and downgraded or laid off employees in inverse
order pf seniority.8 The trial court agreed with the plaintiff's argu-
ments.
The defendant argued unsuccessfully that the transfer was
necessary because of a reduced shop workload. Moreover, the
defendant asserted that reasonable accommodation required only
a de minimus effort and that defendant's efforts exceeded this
standard.9 The trial court disagreed, finding that the employer
could have used other nondiscriminatory transfer procedures.
The court held that, under the employment practices statute, an
employer reassigning handicapped personnel must make reasona-
ble accommodations for their disabilities and that the defendant
failed to meet this standard.'0 The court awarded plaintiff back
pay and directed defendant to reinstate plaintiff at his former
grade of employment." On appeal, the Washington Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed.
The decision in Holland was the supreme court's first inter-
pretation of the relatively new statutory protection of the handi-
capped. In 1973, the state legislature amended the Washington
Law Against Discrimination 2 to prohibit employment discrimi-
nation because of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap. This
amendment resulted, in part, from a growing awareness of the
grave difficulties the handicapped encounter in the job market.' 3
8. Brief for Respondent at 31-37, Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wash. 2d 384, 583 P.2d
621 (1978).
9. Reply Brief for Appellant at 5-6.
10. 90 Wash. 2d at 387, 583 P.2d at 622.
11. The court also awarded vacation pay and $22,473 in attorney's fees. Id. at 392-
93, 583 P.2d at 625.
12. Ch. 214, §1, 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1648 (appears as amended at WASH.
Rev. CODE § 49.60.010 (Supp. 1978)).
13. Discrimination against the handicapped has taken many other forms as well.
Public school systems have denied equal educational opportunity to handicapped chil-
dren. Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physi-
cally Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 1501 (1973). By their very design, public buildings and
transportation systems restrict or exclude access by the physically disabled. Id. at 1506-
12. Moreover, the handicapped have had to fight discriminatory laws impairing their
rights to marry, have children, travel on airplanes, and even to appear in public. Burgdorf
& Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualification of Handicapped Persons
1979]
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The obstacles include outright refusal by employers to hire handi-
capped persons, rigid physical examinations required by many
employers, and physical and structural barriers in the work en-
vironment. 5 Employment discrimination has been widespread,
with the unemployment rate among the disabled as high as fifty
percent. 6 Thus in 1973, attempting to solve these problems, the
Washington Legislature included the handicapped as a protected
class in the antidiscrimination statute. 7
In construing this statutory protection, the court emphasized
the unique character of the handicapped as a class. Persons in
other protected classifications, such as racial minorities and
women, have no inherent job-related differences from the general
as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 861-
65 (1975).
14. Comment, Equal Employment and the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J. L. &
Soc. PROB. 457, 458 (1974).
15. Id. at 488. In addition, these societal obstacles often create further problems for
the disabled, by instilling self-doubt, which in turn undermines their efforts to find em-
ployment.
16. Note, supra note 13, at 1512 n.78. Estimates place the number of physically
disabled at 22 million in the United States. Comment, Potluck Protectionstfor Handi-
capped Discriminatees: The Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the
Basis of Disability, 8 Lov. CHI. L.J. 814, 815 (1977). One estimate, extrapolating from 1970
census figures, is that there are probably 400,000 handicapped in Washington. Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 1, 1978, at C7, col. 3.
Statistics in this area, however, are meaningful only if the class is clearly defined.
The most diverse of the protected classes, the "handicapped" include persons with visible
and invisible handicaps, temporary and permanent disabilities, the mobility-disabled and
persons otherwise able-bodied but with medical problems such as epilepsy. This great
diversity also complicates litigation of employment discrimination cases. For example,
whether an employer hires epileptics has no bearing on the question of that employer's
discrimination against blind persons. Gittler, supra note 2, at 972.
17. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color,
national origin, sex, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap
is recognized and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not
be limited to:
(a) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (1976). The law also prohibits discrimination in financial
institutions, credit transactions, insurance transactions, places of public resort, accommo-
dations, assemblage and amusement, and real estate transactions. WASH. REV. CODE §§
49.60.175, .176, .178, .215, .222 (1976). The law, however, has some puzzling inconsisten-
cies. Although WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (1976) prohibits discrimination because of
race, creed, color, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory,
mental, or physical handicap, various sections of the law omit one or more of the protected
classes in the areas covered. For example, only the section defining unfair employment
practices specifically protects the handicapped; the other unfair practices sections do not.
These differences are apparently attributable to legislative oversights. See Comment,
RCW § 49.60: A Discriminating Look, 13 GONZ. L. REv. 190, 200 (1977).
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population, whereas handicapped persons are different because of
their disabilities.'" Therefore, the court reasoned, legislation to
eliminate handicap discrimination flows from the need for special
treatment of the handicapped. The court concluded that the leg-
islature, in amending the law against discrimination, intended
employers to take positive steps toward eliminating handicap
discrimination. 9 The court noted a contrary interpretation would
only perpetuate work conditions presently discriminating against
the handicapped. 0
The Holland court, perceiving the special nature of handicap
discrimination, required employers to accommodate disabled
workers. In so doing, the court adopted as its rule of decision a
State Human Rights Commission regulation.2' The regulation
states it is an unfair employment practice to fail to reasonably
accommodate handicapped employees unless the employer can
show such accommodation would cause undue hardship."2 The
court found support in this regulation for its interpretation of the
statute as requiring positive action by employers.2 3 Thus, the su-
18. 90 Wash. 2d at 388, 583 P.2d at 623.
19. The court emphasized the statute's strong statements of policy. Id. A provision
of the statute declares that discrimination is a matter of state concern and "threatens not
only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and
foundations of a free democratic state." WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.010 (1976).
20. 90 Wash. 2d at 389, 583 P.2d at 623.
21. WASH. AD. CODE § 162-22-080 (1977). WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.010, .051 (1976)
charge the commission with enforcing the law.
22. The regulation provides in full:
(1) It is an unfair practice for an employer to fail or refuse to make reason-
able accommodations to the sensory, mental, or physical limitations of employ-
ees, unless the employer can demonstrate that such an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
(2) It is an unfair practice for an employer to refuse to hire or [to] other-
wise discriminate against an able handicapped worker because the employer will
be subject to the requirements of this section if the worker is hired, promoted,
etc.
(3) The cost of accommodating an able handicapped worker will be con-
sidered to be an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business only
if it is unreasonably high in view of the size of the employer's business, the value
of the employee's work, whether the cost can be included in planned remodeling
or maintenance, the requirements of other laws and contracts, and other appro-
priate considerations.
WASH. AD. CODE § 162-22-080 (1977).
23. 90 Wash. 2d at 389, 583 P.2d at 623. The court noted that subsection (1) seems
to address physical barriers in the workplace. Id. at 389 n.2, 583 P.2d at 623 n.2. Subsec-
tion (3), in its reference to "remodeling or maintenance," also clearly addresses physical
environment. The court, however, broadly interpreted the regulation as a whole to support
other types of accommodation. Id. at 389, 583 P.2d at 623.
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preme court held that Boeing's efforts to place the plaintiff in an
equal grade position after the initial discriminatory transfer did
not meet the reasonable accommodation test.
In requiring the employer to make reasonable accommoda-
tion of an employee's disability, the court expressly rejected the
defendant's argument that accommodation requires only a de
minimus effort.24 The defendant argued that the de minimus test,
used by the United States Supreme Court in Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison,5 a religious discrimination case arising
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 2' applied in
Holland.Y This test requires employers to undertake only such
moderate efforts as attempting to resolve the problem by meeting
with the employee, attempting to find him another job, or author-
izing a union representative to seek another job for the em-
ployee.3 But, according to the Holland court, such efforts are not
adequate in the case of handicap discrimination.
The court refused to apply the Hardison test by noting that
Congress has not included the handicapped as a protected class
under the Civil Rights Act.Y Congress, however, had passed the
Rehabilitation Act of 197310 to protect handicapped Americans.
The United States Department of Labor Regulations, issued pur-
suant to section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, require affirmative
measures in accommodating the handicapped.3 The court con-
cluded this federal statutory and regulatory scheme recognizes
that de minimus accommodation efforts do not adequately pro-
tect the handicapped.12 The court reemphasized that the special
nature of handicap discrimination requires affirmative measures
to alleviate its harms3 and implied that closer scrutiny is re-
quired in this area than in other kinds of discrimination.
3 4
24. Id. at 390, 583 P.2d at 624.
25. 432 U.S. 63, 77 (1977).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
27. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2-3.
28. 432 U.S. at 77.
29. 90 Wash. 2d at 390, 583 P.2d at 624.
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976).
31. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1979).
32. 90 Wash. 2d at 390, 583 P.2d at 624.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 390 n.4, 583 P.2d at 624 n.4. Yet another important reason existed for the
court to distinguish Holland from Hardison. A case of alleged religious discrimination,
Hardison presented a problem not arising in Holland. The Hardison Court was very
concerned about the reverse discrimination effort of imposing a higher standard than de
minimus effort on the employer. In their view, accommodating Hardison might well in-
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To implement this scrutiny, the court enunciated severalcriteria for evaluating employment practices. First, the court for-mulated a test for establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-tion. The test for employee transfers is whether business condi-tions necessitate the move. Second, the court stated that once theplaintiff showed that his employer had alternatives to the dis-puted transfer, the employer had the burden of showing the movewas necessary because of a reduced workload. 36 The court implied
the existence of reasonable alternative transfer methods pre-cluded the showing of conditions justifying the transfer. Thus,because Boeing could have transferred someone else in place ofHolland or undertaken other alternatives, 37 the alleged reducedworkload did not necessitate the disputed transfer, and Boeingfailed to carry its burden of showing nondiscrimination.
The Holland court drew a clear distinction between the cri-teria for deciding transfer cases and those for deciding discrimi-natory hiring practices cases.38 In the failure'-to-hire cases, theplaintiff must show he qualifies for an available position denied
him. But when an employer transfers a handicapped employeefrom a job he was performing satisfactorily, the employee needonly show that the employer had other options. 9 This is an impor-tant holding for the employee because the burden of showing theemployer's options is much less than the burden of proving his
qualifications for other existing jobs.
In establishing its criteria, the Holland court repeatedlyemphasized the inherent difference between handicapped per-sons and other protected classes. Protected classes, such as racialminorities and women, face competitive disadvantages primarilybecause of societal prejudices40 rather than inherent job-related
fringe on the religious freedom of other employees, an impermissible result under the CivilRights Act. See 432 U.S. at 81. Because Washington explicitly recognizes a higher thande minimus standard, however, the reverse discrimination problem does not arise incorrecting handicap discrimination. See WASH. AD. CODE § 162-22-080 (1977), note 22supra; note 55 infra. See generally Comment, Defining Religious Discrimination in Em-ployment: Has Reasonable Accommodation Survived Hardison?, 2 U. PUGET SD. L. REv.343 (1979). But see text accompanying notes 53-55 infra.
35. Although the court's opinion did not speak of a test or prima facie case, thisanalytical framework describes the effect of the Holland decision.
36. 90 Wash. 2d at 391, 583 P.2d at 624-25.
37. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
38. 90 Wash. 2d at 391, 583 P.2d at 624-25. The court distinguished Holland fromMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a failure-to-hire case.
39. 90 Wash. 2d at 391, 583 P.2d at 624-25.
40. Baker, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualified Handicapped Individuals, 49
S. CAL. L. REv. 785, 802 (1976).
[Vol. 3:281288 University of Puget Sound Law Review
capabilities. Handicapped persons as a protected class face a
unique difficulty: the very trait bringing them into a protected
class, their disabilities, can affect job performance. Thus, in a job
market not taking into account their disabilities, the handi-
capped will usually lose out in competition with nonhandicapped
persons. Identical treatment of handicapped and nonhandi-
capped employees will perpetuate discrimination; different treat-
ment, such as compensating for a disability," may eliminate dis-
crimination. As the Holland court recognized, elimination of the
competitive disadvantage necessarily involves accommodation of
the disability.
The critical point of the Holland decision, and its importance
in Washington law, is the nature of the reasonable accommoda-
tion the court requires of employers. The majority opinion trans-
formed the accommodation requirement into a test establishing
prima facie discrimination when the employer has alternatives to
the disputed transfer. The concurring opinion, however, would
place on the plaintiff the burden of proving another job exists for
which he qualifies. Under the concurring rationale, Boeing's ef-
forts to find a similar-grade position after the transfer would have
met the reasonable accommodation obligation.
42
The concurring opinion, however, did not recognize that the
crucial discriminatory act was Boeing's initial removal of the
plaintiff from his job, not the company's later attempt to find a
job replacement. The plaintiff should not have the burden of
locating another position after already demonstrating his qualifi-
cations in the original job. The concurring justices also overlooked
a crucial fact in the majority's evaluation of Boeing's actions: the
employer knew that Holland had previously failed a test of skill
required in the new job. 43 This knowledge was indicative of the
employer's failure to try to accommodate the plaintiffs disabil-
ity.
Of necessity, under either opinion, the extent of the em-
ployer's duty of accommodation must await some clarification in
future cases.4 Nevertheless, the Holland decision indicates the
41. Some measures to compensate for disability include: restructuring jobs, modify-
ing work schedules, acquiring special equipment or devices, and providing readers or
interpreters. Linn, New Trends in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 14 TRIAL 32,
34-35 (1978).
42. 90 Wash. 2d at 394, 583 P.2d at 626.
43. Id. at 391, 583 P.2d at 624.
44. To some extent, the case-by-case approach adopted by both the majority and
concurring opinions is necessary. The great variation in type and severity of handicaps
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accommodation standard will be stringent. The court's rejectionof the de minimus test demonstrates that employers will have tomake more than nominal efforts to accommodate handicappedemployees."s The only formal check on the reasonable accommo-dation requirement is the proviso of the agency regulation thecourt adopted.46 The regulation requires the employer to reasona-bly accommodate the disabled unless the employer can show thiswill result in undue hardship. In analogous federal regulations,undue hardship provides a yardstick for measuring the em-ployer's accommodation effort. In judging such efforts, courtsconsider primarily the expense involved and the employer's re-sources. 7
Pleading undue hardship as a defense would not have beenpersuasive under the Holland facts. Indeed, the Holland court didnot expressly consider hardship although the trial court indicatedthat requiring Boeing to choose one of the alternative transferprocedures"s imposed no economic hardship or serious inconveni-ence. The supreme court's reiteration of the strong policy embod-ied in the antidiscrimination statute indicates, however, thateven if inconvenience or substantial expense resulted, the courtwould have required the employer to use alternative transfermethods.
plus the wide range of size and capabilities of employers require the courts to be flexible
in dealing with each new case.
45. Some cases arising under federal law have imposed significant burdens of accom-modation. See, e.g., Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977) (courtgranted preliminary injunction requiring college to hire sign language interpreter for deafstudent); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184(3d Cir. 1977) (while court did not base its decision on express reasonable accommodationrequirement, opinion enumerated ways schools could have overcome various problemsassociated with having blind teacher in the classroom). For more extensive coverage offederal and state laws in this area, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND THE HANDICAPPED,
SELECTED LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE HANDICAPPED (1978).
46. For the pertinent regulatory language see note 22 supra, subsection (1).Within the context of the unfair practices statute itself there are two other bases foran employer lawfully refusing to hire a handicapped person. See note 7 supra. One is thatthe handicap prevents the "proper performance" of the worker. The second is that thehandicap prevents the worker from fulfilling a bona fide occupational qualification(BFOQ). Kimmel v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 23 Wash. App. 78, 83, 596 P.2d 1069, 1072(1979). See generally Gittler, supra note 2, at 977-80 (a discussion of the BFOQ as it shouldapply to handicap discrimination).
47. Subsection (3) of the regulation prescribes consideration of these factors. This hasalso been the approach of federal regulations establishing the reasonable accommodationstandard. See Guy, The Developing Law on Equal Employment Opportunity for theHandicapped: Overview and Analysis of the Major Issues, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 183, 270-71
(1978).
48. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
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The court's imposition of a heavy burden on employers will
undoubtedly evoke protest. Some people will question whether
employers, and society as a whole, should bear such costs to bene-
fit a small minority.49 On a societal level at least, this criticism
is refutable. First, society will bear an even greater cost to support
the unemployed handicapped. The number of employable handi-
capped is large. 0 From a strictly economic viewpoint, it is ineffi-
cient and expensive to pay people to remain unemployed or un-
deremployed because of unnecessary barriers. Moreover, it is eco-
nomically wasteful to neglect such a store of skilled and willing
workers. 5' Second, our society has long espoused a policy of inte-
gration of the handicapped into our society.52 Recent passage of
antidiscrimination statutes and affirmative action requirements
reflect attempts by the nation's legislatures to finally effectuate
this policy. The Holland decision furthers this objective by speci-
fying the employer's responsibility for nondiscriminatory prac-
tices.
The decision's accommodation requirement will have ramifi-
cations beyond the employer-employee relationship. Holland will
probably create some on-the-job problems for the handicapped.
The court clearly stated that in accommodating a handicapped
employee, an employer may have to act. to the detriment of other
49. See NEWSWEEK, Jan. 15, 1979, at 36. Although it may be expensive to remodel
public structures to make them accessible to the handicapped, it is important to note that
the cost will be negligible when the accommodations are designed into the structure.
Hearings on a Barrier-Free Environment for the Elderly and the Handicapped Before the
Special Comm. on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 136 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. Net costs of building barrier-free environments are further reduced by lowered
insurance rates. Comment, Access to Buildings and Equal Employment Opportunity for
the Disabled: Survey of State Statutes, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 1067, 1079 n.71 (1977).
Moreover, improving access to public facilities benefits the general population, in-
cluding the elderly, children, the temporarily ill, and pregnant women, all of whom suffer
when access is difficult and awkward. As an example, long flights of stairs create problems
for all but the most able-bodied and unencumbered. Hearings, supra, at 27, 32; Comment,
supra, at 1067.
50. See Comment, supra note 16, at 815; Gittler, supra note 2, at 954 n.3. Of the
estimated 14 million employable physically handicapped, only 800,000 are working. Of the
5.6 million mentally retarded, 90% could work if properly trained. Id.
51. The handicapped, like the rest of the population, need and desire work for the
independence and the stimulation it provides. Moreover, studies indicate that properly
placed handicapped workers have performance and safety records as good as or better than
nonhandicapped workers. Comment, supra note 16, at 821; Note, supra note 13, at 1513.
52. tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54
CAL. L. REV. 841, 843-47 (1966). This article provides a very valuable overview of the
difficulties the handicapped have encountered in passing and enforcing antidiscrimi-
nation legislation. In one eloquent passage, the author, himself disabled, equates barriers
to the handicapped with house arrest. Id. at 848.
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employees53 Some alternatives to the disputed Holland transferwould require shifting or even laying off other employees."' Whilelegally valid, 5 this approach may create considerable resentmentamong nonhandicapped employees. This attitude may cause aproblem for handicapped employees until society adjusts to thenew protected status of the handicapped. This is a cost the disa-bled will undoubtedly consider outweighed by the benefit in al-lowing them to lead full, independent lives.Although Holland addresses only the problem of a discrimi-natory transfer, several factors support extending the reasonableaccommodation standard to discriminatory hiring practices.First, the antidiscrimination statute the court broadly inter-preted expressly forbids discrimination in hiring."6 Moreover, theHuman Rights Commission regulation the court adopted makesit illegal for an employer to refuse to hire a disabled worker toavoid being subject to the regulation. 51 Finally, the court's per-ception of the special nature of handicap discrimination will nec-essarily apply to hiring practices.
Under Holland, the principal difference between hiring andtransfer practices is the method of establishing a prima facie caseof discrimination. The court recognized that transfer procedurescan have as discriminatory an impact on the employment pros-pects of the handicapped as hiring and firing practices. InHolland, the employer arbitrarily and unnecessarily removed theemployee from a job he was already performing satisfactorily andplaced him in a position where it was inevitable he would fail.5"The plaintiff had successfully demonstrated his qualification for
53. See Guy, supra note 47, at 273.
54. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
55. The handicapped are unique among protected classes. They have no counterpartwho may challenge affirmative action in their favor as discriminatory. For example, sexdiscrimination legislation forbids preferential treatment of one sex over the other. TheWashington statute on handicap discrimination, however, is not worded to forbid consid-eration of a physical condition. Rather, it forbids discrimination against one who has ahandicap. Guy, supra note 47, at 269 n.313. Moreover, in Washington, a Human RightsCommission regulation states explicitly that preferential treatment of the handicappedin employment practices does not constitute discrimination against nonhandicapped em-ployees. WASH. AD. CODE § 162-22-060 (1977).
Under Washington law only one other protected class has selective protection similarto that of the handicapped. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.090 limits age discrimination protec-tion to the "mature worker"-the person aged 40 to 65. Gross v. Lynnwood, 90 Wash. 2d
395, 399, 583 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1978).
56. For the text of subsection (1), see note 7 supra.
57. For the text of subsection (2), see note 22 supra.
58. 90 Wash. 2d at 391, 583 P.2d at 624.
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a position denied him and thus did not need to prove his qualifi-
cations for some other available job. A contrary result would se-
verely weaken the disabled worker's statutorily guaranteed right
to nondiscriminatory job opportunities. A disabled worker suc-
cessfully surmounting the hiring obstacles could find his job
threatened by arbitrary transfers. Thus, while the plaintiff's bur-
den is greater in hiring cases, it is nevertheless similar to that of
transfer cases. The major difference is that where reassignments
are involved, the plaintiff has already established his qualifica-
tions by satisfactorily performing the job.
In Holland, the Washington Supreme Court correctly gave a
broad construction to the Washington Law Against Discrimina-
tion. Requiring employers to make reasonable accommodation in
job transfers to the limitations of disabled employees effectively
carries out the state's legislative policy. The court's application
of the reasonable accommodation standard and its explicit rejec-
tion of a de minimus effort test indicate that Washington employ-
ers will have to comply with stringent accommodation require-
ments. In some cases this may involve significant expenditure of
time and money. But the special nature of handicap discrimina-
tion necessitates these costs if we are to integrate the disabled
fully into society and foster full human development.
Joanne Whitehead
